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in the target rate was less than some market ana-
lysts had hoped for. Perhaps as a consequence,
on the day of the policy action, the Dow Jones
Industrial average declined 2.4 percent and the
S&P 500 and the Nasdaq declined 2.4 and 4.8
percent, respectively.
About a month later, on April 18, 2001, the
FOMC again reduced the funds rate target by 50
basis points. This action occurred during the
intermeeting period and took the market com-
pletely by surprise. Although the market had
priced in a 50 basis point cut at the forthcoming
May 15 FOMC meeting, essentially no part of the
April 18 intermeeting move was priced into the
federal funds futures rate at that time. In this case,
the stock market reacted positively, with the Dow
increasing by 3.9 percent that day and the S&P
500 and the Nasdaq increasing by 3.9 and 8.1
percent, respectively.
The equity price responses illustrate a point
that I believe is true more generally: Policy-
induced market responses are unproductive
except in certain circumstances. Indeed, I will
attempt to convince you that monetary policy
worksbestwhenFedpolicyactionsarecompletely
anticipated by the time they occur—that is, when
policy actions are a nonevent in the markets.
The corollary to this proposition is that large
market responses to monetary policy action or
inaction can represent, depending on circum-
stances and at least to some degree, a potential
failing of monetary policy. Of course, market
reactions to news are part of the American land-
scape. They will not be eliminated no matter how
hard the Fed attempts to convey its intentions to
the public. I hope to convince you that aligning
P
rices in speculative markets respond
sensitively to all kinds of events,
including policy actions and fre-
quently even hints of policy actions.
The response of markets to policy actions has
fascinated me for a long time. This fascination
only intensified after I became president of the
St. Louis Fed. The markets I am referring to
include the equity, bond, commodity, and foreign
exchange markets. Although I think of policy
actions in the broad sense, this afternoon I will
limit my discussion to Federal Reserve policy
actions. My discussion today is an application
of, and further development of, an argument I
first outlined in a speech in Philadelphia in
August 1999.
Before proceeding further, I want to acknowl-
edge the valuable comments provided by my
colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
especially those by Daniel Thornton, vice presi-
dent in the Research Division at the Bank, and
Robert Rasche, director of Research. However, I
accept full responsibility for errors. The views
expressed are mine and do not necessarily reflect
official positions of the Federal Reserve System.
The fact that markets react to information
about monetary policy is illustrated by the stock
market’sreactiontothelasttwoFedpolicyactions.
At its regularly scheduled meeting on March 20,
2001, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) reduced the target for the federal funds
rate by 50 basis points. This action was widely
anticipated, as the entire 50 basis points move
was priced into the federal funds futures rate at
the close of business the day before. While this
action was widely anticipated, the size of the cutmarket expectations with policy should be an
important central bank objective, even though it
will never be fully achieved. To be very explicit
about a point I’ve made above implicitly, I do
not believe that all reactions to changes in the
funds rate target represent a failing of monetary
policy. Sometimes the market gets it wrong no
matter how hard the Fed tries. The Fed has a
responsibility to get policy right even if doing so
surprises the market.
This argument motivates the title of my
speech today: “Getting Markets in Synch with
Monetary Policy.” This is also the title of the
St. Louis Fed’s annual economic conference this
year, to be held at the Bank on October 11 to 12,
2001. Our hope is that this conference will give
us better insight into how we might get markets
more in synch with monetary policy.
THE EFFICIENT MARKETS
PARADIGM
The efficient markets paradigm is at the core
of my belief. According to the efficient markets
hypothesis, speculative markets respond effi-
ciently as market participants assess all relevant
information. Absolutely everything that might
influence markets is reflected in market prices.
Given that investors bid current prices to levels
at which risk-adjusted expected rates of return
are equalized across various investment alterna-
tives, each new piece of information may move
market prices. The efficient markets model is not
perfect, but it certainly goes a long way to explain
the behavior of speculative prices.
Markets respond to the flow of all sorts of
information, including that from the central bank.
Federal Reserve policy actions and statements
by Federal Reserve officials—especially the
chairman—affect market expectations and,
therefore, market prices.
Of course, only new information matters.
Everything that is known or could be predicted
has already been bid into market prices; only the
reports coming across the wires that change the
probabilities of future outcomes affect current
market prices. This point is well understood by
most market participants and most in the financial
press.
MONETARY POLICY ACTIONS
Now consider the interactions of speculative
markets with monetary policy actions. Market
participants are trying to forecast the future, and
so they are naturally interested in what the Fed
is trying to do. I will now make the assumption—
which I think is accurate, but will not discuss
further here—that the goal of the Federal Reserve
is to keep the rate of inflation low and steady, a
goal that I’ll call “price stability.” Insofar as pos-
sible, given its price stability goal, the Fed also
wants its policy actions to contribute to the sta-
bility of employment and output. I believe that
price stability will, if anything, yield lower aver-
age unemployment than would be achieved at
higher inflation. Hence, when policymakers pur-
sue stable prices, they simultaneously pursue the
goal of maximum sustainable economic growth.
Consequently, I assume that the Fed’s primary
goal is price stability and its secondary goal is
stability of output and employment, to the extent
possible.
Markets must not only assess the Fed’s goals,
but the likelihood the Fed will be able to achieve
them. Consequently, for the sake of making my
point, I also assume that the Fed can achieve its
goals by making adjustments to its policy instru-
ment. The Fed’s policy goals and procedures are
key pieces of information that help market partici-
pants predict how the Fed will respond to new
information.
The Fed’s principal policy instrument—and
I will assume its only policy instrument—is the
federal funds rate. The final outcome of each
meeting of the FOMC is its decision on the target,
or intended, federal funds rate. In a manner similar
to efficient markets, policymakers set their policy
instrument at a level consistent with their policy
objective, given all of the information available
at the time. Only in a static world would the Fed
keep the funds rate constant forever. As new infor-
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ers evaluate the information and decide whether
or not to change the setting of the policy instru-
ment. Markets anticipate that the Fed will adjust
the funds rate in response to new information
about the economy in a manner consistent with
its policy objective. The important question is
when and by how much will the Fed change the
federal funds rate?
FOMC members are constantly examining
the flow of incoming information on the state of
the economy and deciding what policy actions
may be necessary to keep the economy on the
desired track. The implications of a particular
event or piece of news for policy are rarely per-
fectly clear. For one thing, individual FOMC mem-
bers may have different interpretations of the
incoming flow of data and the appropriate policy
responses. Moreover, information tends to arrive
in “packets,” not in individual pieces. Each day
brings new information on a variety of variables.
The response to a particular piece of information
is always conditional on information about other
variables—the policy relevance of a fall in equity
prices, for example, is different when other eco-
nomic indicators suggest the economy is strong
than when such indicators suggest the economy
may be weakening. Economics provides consid-
erable guidance on how policymakers should
respond, but the timing and size of the response
is frequently unclear. Indeed, in some instances
even the appropriate direction of policy action is
unclear.
Despite these limitations, it is convenient to
think about policy as if, in principle, there is a
correct policy response to new information that
comes in during the intermeeting period. The job
of the FOMC is to evaluate this information and
dial in the appropriate response at its next meet-
ing. The appropriate response is often to keep the
funds rate steady. Indeed, I believe that one of
the greatest benefits that a high degree of market
confidence in the Fed affords is that it enables
the Fed to wait until new information makes it
quite clear what policy action is appropriate. Of
course, given the lags in the effects of monetary
policy on the economy, there is always a danger
that policymakers will wait too long before acting.
Now consider the markets’ reaction to policy
actions. At this point, let’s assume that the mar-
kets and the Fed get the same information at the
same time—neither has an informational advan-
tage. It is easy to see the nature of the expectational
equilibrium in such an environment. If the markets
know the Fed’s policy objectives and what policy
adjustments are appropriate given the new infor-
mation, the markets and the Fed have a common
response. Each time the FOMC meets, the markets
know what policy adjustment, if any, is necessary
and desirable. When the Fed adjusts policy
according to its objectives and the information it
has received since the last meeting, no one is
surprised—the Fed’s action is a nonevent to the
markets. The market’s expectation is fulfilled
because the market and the Fed have interpreted
the same information the same way.
If the FOMC acts as the market expects, the
FOMC’s actions will not themselves be informa-
tion and will elicit no adjustment of market prices.
Those adjustments will have already taken place
during the period between FOMC meetings as
the markets respond to the steady flow of new
information in the form of the employment report,




An environment where markets and the Fed
respond in the same way to the same information
is clearly idealized, but I believe it is the environ-
ment the FOMC should be striving to achieve.
Price stability is desirable because avoiding
inflation surprises adds to the efficiency of the
market economy and promotes maximum sus-
tainable economic growth. Of course, we cannot
avoid all surprises. By nature, the future is unpre-
dictable. These unpredictable events include
natural disturbances, such as earthquakes and
floods, political disturbances at home and abroad,
many changes in tastes and technology, and so
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these disturbances most of the time.
Nearly everyone believes that, when possible,
monetary policy should offset shocks to prevent
them from pushing the economy away from price
stability. A less well-recognized way that monetary
policy can contribute to the goal of maintaining
price stability is to prevent monetary policy dis-
turbances per se from adversely affecting price
stability.
My analysis assumes that policymakers’ goals
and the public’s goals are the same. When they
are different, policymakers may have an incentive
to surprise the market. When the goals are the
same, however, it is difficult to conceive of situ-
ations where policymakers have an incentive to
surprise or fool the public just for the sake of sur-
prise itself. Surprises may sometimes be necessary
to get policy right, and are therefore unavoidable,
but they are not in and of themselves desirable.
For many years now the Fed has pursued the
goal of price stability with genuine conviction. I
believe that society shares the goal and under-
stands and appreciates that conviction.
I don’t really believe that the coincidence of
policymakers’ goals and the public’s goals is an
assumption. In a democratic society, I am inclined
to think that it is impossible for a central bank to
pursue long-run goals that are not acceptable to
society at large. This does not mean that society
immediately accepts the central bank’s goals.
There is likely to be some learning on both sides.
The point I want to make here is that the
markets and the Fed cannot converge on a com-
mon understanding of the direction of monetary
policy if the Fed does not pursue its goals in a
consistent fashion over time. The job of the cen-
tral bank is to maintain a clear focus on price
stability and to convey that focus to the markets.
Thecentralbankandthemarketscanthenrespond
in identical fashion to the flow of incoming
information because they reach the same conclu-
sion about the implications of the information
for monetary policy. In this environment, market
participants are not surprised by the Fed’s action
because they also know what needs to be done.
There are a number of examples that illustrate
how making sure the market understands policy-
makers’ intentions improves the response. I will
mention only two. In the mid-1960s, the Board
of Governors began stating why the discount rate
was changed when it announced a discount rate
change. Frequently, the discount rate was changed
simply to bring it into alignment with market
rates that had changed. We now know that when
rate alignment was the only reason that the Board
gave for the discount rate change, market rates
did not respond, which is just as the Fed intended.
However, when the Board gave some other reason
for the changes, market rates responded signifi-
cantly. Prior to the mid-1960s, the Board simply
announced discount rate changes and the market
responded significantly even when the Board
was simply realigning the discount rate to market
rates. Hence, when the Board was not clear about
its intentions when changing the discount rate,
market rates responded even when the change in
the discount rate was not motivated by policy
considerations.
A second example occurred on December 3,
1990, when the Board of Governors announced
that, effective December 13, 1990, it was reducing
from 3 percent to zero percent the reserve require-
ment on certain nonpersonal time deposits and
eurocurrency liabilities. The effect of this action
was to reduce reserve requirements by a total of
about $13.2 billion. The Board had given no indi-
cation that it was going to take this step. Even
many inside the Federal Reserve were surprised
by the action. As a result of this surprise action,
the federal funds rate was higher and generally
more volatile for about two and a half months, as
banks adjusted to their new circumstance.
In contrast, on February 18, 1992, the Board
announced that the reserve requirement on
transactions deposits would be reduced from 12
percent to 10 percent effective April 2, 1992. This
action reduced total reserve requirements by
nearly $9 billion. In this case, however, the change
was announced well in advance of its effective
date, giving banks adequate time to prepare for
the new circumstance. As a result, there was no
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federal funds rate.
I think this idealized picture takes us a long
way toward understanding how monetary policy
and the markets should interact when policy is
on a successful track. In this environment, the
Fed and the markets are in synch. With complete
synchronization, the markets and the Fed have a
common understanding of the objectives of mone-
tary policy and a common interpretation of the
significance of incoming information.
Market prices that anticipate what the FOMC
will do are a necessary ingredient of effective
monetary policy. Regularity and predictability
are important to the success of policy. If the public
knows that policymakers want stable prices and
will carry out the actions necessary to achieve
price stability, firms and workers will be less
inclined to take actions that are inconsistent with
the Fed’s policy objective. Investors and entrepre-
neurs will be more willing to undertake projects
that would be adversely affected by inflation
surprises. Market success in anticipating FOMC
actions indicates the Fed’s success in designing
policies to achieve those goals that society accepts
and in conveying those policies to the public.
This ideal policy does not mean that the Fed
is simply following markets or that the Fed is not
exercising proper leadership. Indeed, there may
be instances where the market gets it wrong. In
such instances, policymakers must do what they
have to do even if the policy action surprises the
market. Such market surprises are a natural part
of the learning process and are bound to occur
from time to time.
For example, there have been instances when,
for one reason or another, policy drifted signifi-
cantly off course, eventually requiring the Fed to
take rather drastic actions. One such instance
occurred in October 1979, when the Fed was
forced to pay much more attention to monetary
aggregates in implementing policy. When policy
goes off course, changes in the direction of policy
are both necessary and desirable. Such changes
will inevitably surprise the markets.
There have also been occasions when policy
took wrong turns, such as the 1971 policy of com-
prehensive wage and price controls. I include
this case because the introduction of wage and
price controls had monetary policy implications.
Many observers, including some policymakers,
thought price controls would take care of inflation
and permit monetary policy to be more expan-
sionary, to drive down unemployment. The unfor-
tunate thing about both the 1971 and the 1979
changes in policy was that they occurred in the
first place as a consequence of policy going off
course.
Clearly, policymakers can sink (S-I-N-K) the
markets, or send them into orbit when a surprise
policy action boosts market prices. To me, sinking
or orbiting the markets will ordinarily be unde-
sirable. A market surprise can occur because an
undesirable policy is being corrected, or because
policy is taking off in an unforeseen and, perhaps,
undesirable direction, as in the above examples.
More often, however, policymakers have simply
done a poor job in making their objective known.
The street runs both ways: Sharp changes in
market prices can also occur when the market
errs. I have deep respect for market judgments,
but do not believe that they are invariably correct.
Sometimes markets wake up to errors, and prices
adjust rapidly. Very little is known about this
subject, but the 1987 stock market crash is cer-
tainly an example of a market error. No economic
data or policy changes arrived at the time of the
crash to justify an adjustment that large. Conse-
quently, the crash was an error, the market
advance prior to the crash was an error, or both
were errors.
At times policymakers may find it necessary
or desirable to take unanticipated actions to
clarify the direction of policy. Consider the 1987
stock market crash and the Fed’s response. The
crash was a truly frightening event; if the Fed
had not acted, I have little doubt that uncertain-
ties would have multiplied and market volatility
would have increased further, or at least remained
at markedly elevated levels. Uncertainty would
have affected the credit markets in general, and
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there was widespread commentary to the effect
that a recession was likely. By acting promptly,
the Fed reassured the markets that liquidity
would be available as needed to prevent cascad-
ing problems. The Fed’s effort was clearly and
unambiguously successful. There was no reces-
sion and no serious disturbances spread to credit
markets. Stock market volatility declined. Simi-
larly,inOctober1998,theFOMCsurprisedmarkets
by acting quickly in the face of a severe liquidity
crisis with accompanying disruptions to credit
markets subsequent to the Russian default.
Certainly, one way to get the market’s atten-
tion at the present time is by making intermeeting
surprise changes in the funds rate target. Before
1994, however, intermeeting changes were the
rule rather than the exception and consequently
were not of special note as they are now. Because
they have been relatively infrequent recently,
intermeeting moves currently tend to garner
more attention than actions taken at regularly
scheduled meetings.
The research question is under what condi-
tions, beyond clear and dramatic cases such as
the 1987 stock market crash or the 1998 liquidity
crisis, do surprise policy actions serve to clarify
the direction of policy? One dimension of such a
research agenda might be to examine the effect
of surprise policy actions on market uncertainty.
Are there good market measures of uncertainty,
beyond survey information that arrives at discrete
intervals and has various problems of interpreta-
tion? If we can find useful measures of market
uncertainty in the equity and bond markets, then
we can begin to explore the conditions under
which surprise policy actions clarify the Fed
policy intent and help to synchronize market
expectations with the direction of Fed policy.
In any event, the key point remains. A large
market response to a Fed policy action is evidence
that the markets and the Fed are not in synch.
The market or the Fed, or both, must have been
operating on the basis of different information,
which may include different assessments of the
significance of readily observable data. The more
complete the convergence of views between the
market and the Fed, the better the economy will
work. Convergence reduces market volatility and
reduces expectational errors, which can lead to
resource misallocation. Firms, for example, may
make investments that prove to be unprofitable
because their expectations were wrong.
The Fed has not reached the point where its
policy actions elicit zero response in the markets.
Nevertheless, the improved accuracy of market
expectations about Fed policy has been striking
in recent years. Let me offer a hypothesis about
the effects of the increased synchronization—a
hypothesis that I have not yet investigated, but
hope to be able to. Everyone agrees that, in recent
years, economic outcomes—in terms of both
inflation and unemployment—have been better
than in the past. My hypothesis is that monetary
policy has been more regular and predictable than
it used to be and that a consequence has been
improved economic performance. This hypothesis
can be tested by examining whether Fed policy
actions account for a smaller fraction of the vari-
ance of interest rate changes in recent years than
in the past. Put the other way around, my hypoth-
esis is that nonpolicy events such as data releases
account for a larger fraction of total interest rate
variance now than they did in the past.
My model of synching the markets and policy
is incomplete in some important respects. Two
issues particularly concern me. First, the pure
version of the model requires that the Fed and
the markets have the same information about the
economy. I think that, relative to the markets, the
Fed actually has superior information in some
cases and inferior information in other cases.
What is clear is that full synchronization with
the markets requires that the Fed pay careful
attention to both collecting and conveying infor-
mation. Transparency and clarity are necessary
ingredients for policy success.
Second, there are considerable differences in
professional opinion about how the economy
works. The debates inside and outside the Fed
are similar. The markets and the Fed will never
be completely in synch because there will always
be something for economists to argue about.
Consequently, the Fed and the markets will not
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is important not to lose sight of the fact that there
is an enormous common base of understanding
between the Fed and the markets and that this
common base has a lot to do with policy success.
CLOSING COMMENT
I’ll close by reemphasizing my main theme.
When the markets and the Fed are in synch, both
will have a common reaction to incoming data
and the markets will correctly anticipate Fed
policy actions. An environment in which markets
correctly anticipate Fed actions implies a situa-
tion in which Fed policy is widely understood,
regular, and predictable. The fact that Fed policy
actions sometimes take the markets by surprise
shows that we have not yet reached this ideal.
Still, it is important to recognize that the Fed
has made tremendous progress over the last 20
years or so in pursuing a consistent policy
designed to establish price stability as the norm
for the economy. The Fed and the markets are
mostly in synch; surprises in the incoming data—
whether on prices, employment, GDP, activity in
economies abroad, and so forth—are surprises to
both markets and the Fed and both read the sur-
prises pretty much the same way. If the market
and Fed readings become identical, we can expect
that Fed policy adjustments will convey no new
information to the market, and therefore market
prices will not respond to them because they are
fully anticipated.
I believe that a policy agenda designed to
heighten the degree to which the Fed and the
markets are in synch is an ambitious and worthy
objective. In my opinion, we in the Fed need to
work on two fronts. One is the policy front itself,
making sure that policy actions are as appropri-
ately timed and scaled as possible. The second is
on the disclosure front, making sure that knowl-
edge inside and outside the Fed converges to the
maximum possible extent.
Progress on both fronts will require continuing
research. It is clear to me that new insights into
the convergence of information, or lack thereof,
between markets and the Fed will play a central
role in this research. My insight today is com-
pletely consistent with—indeed is implied by—
rational expectations macro models. What I had
not done before I came to the Fed was to relate
these abstract models to the daily ebb and flow
of market reactions to new information. The con-
clusion I have been discussing—that, with full
convergence of information, Fed policy actions
will not affect market prices because the market
has already predicted them—initially surprised
me. But the more I think about the matter, the
more compelling the conclusion is. I hope you
find the conclusion compelling as well.
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